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ABSTRACT
The context of this paper is given by the parametric environment
defined by the political reality on one hand and the process of
decentralisation which has gained impetus post 73
rd and 74
th
Constitutional Amendment Acts, on the other. Keeping in view
the process of globalisation and privatisation in the Indian
economy it suggests a conceptual framework for developing
Macro-Diagnostics for evaluating the fiscal health of the Indian
states. Specifically this paper  looks at the state of Madhya
Pradesh. It provides an overview of key fiscal variables and their
dynamics in recent times. It also tries to operationalise the
conceptual framework by way of constructing various indices. It
thus provides an entrée – by way of providing macro
benchmarks – into the rather stiff problem of development of
Madhya Pradesh’s economy.
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1.  Introduction
Indian Economy has been passing through a tumultuous phase in the last
dozen years or so. Unfolding of that eventful saga is common knowledge to all
concerned, as a part of folklore of the contemporary history of Indian Economy. It
continues to provide a point of departure for any meaningful discussion of the
Indian Economy. Globalisation and privatisation apart, the happenings in the
political sphere (especially in the realm of partisan politics) have added a new
parametric dimension to relevant reality. We are of course referring to the
strengthening of regional parties and emergence of coalition politics at all levels
of government. The states have now donned a new avatar and have become key
(sometimes, competing) players in the process of development. The recent
macroeconomic management regimen has meant that whereas on one hand
they are expected to increasingly assume newer responsibilities, on the other
they have to look after themselves when it comes to raising resources. This last
point has become an important central focus after the passage of 73
rd and 74
th
Constitutional Amendments. Decentralisation that was always talked about but
‘never really invited in’ has now finally, taken the centre stage. Consequently, the
political and economic aspects of governance and functional management have
come into sharp focus. No serious social scientist can afford to ignore this
backdrop whilst conducting a meaningful and fruitful discussion regarding
fostering an economically viable civil society in India.
Civil society as an item on economic and political agenda of social
thinkers has staged a dramatic return in the late twentieth century. It has been
used by social scientists in the west as well as the east and across the wide
political spectrum. It has not always meant the same thing to all of them. After all,
civil society is not a new concept. It is much older to Hegel, and entered the2
English language usage through the Latin  translation  Societas  Civilis,  of
Aristotle’s  Koinonia  Politike.(Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001). In its original sense
there was no distinction between the state and the society. Hegel was perhaps
the first to create such a bifurcation. From the point of view of developing
economy like India, we think that it is better to interpret civil society to refer to the
state and non-state initiatives for reorganisation of social life around a modern
sovereign state. The idea has to encompass all levels of governments in the vein
of political decentralisation and has to be comprehensively participative in its
connotation to encompass the NGOs and other such formal and non-formal
private sector institutions.
With the conceptual background mentioned, let us turn to the specific
concerns of our paper. The paper substantially deals with only the economic
aspects of the fiscal operations of Madhya Pradesh’s economy from a macro
view point. This is an exploratory study, trying to develop diagnostics for
evaluating a state’s fiscal health. This paper is divided into four sections including
the introduction. In the next section, we present the conceptual framework that
we will try to operationalise for attempting to develop a diagnostic for evaluating
the fiscal health of a state’s economy. In the third section we provide a backdrop
about the state of Madhya Pradesh and then report our computational results. In
the fourth and last section we conclude.
2.  The Conceptual Framework
There are several macro fiscal variables available that could be looked at. It
is, however, essential to use the principle of parsimony and identify a few crucial
ones. These need to be such that the relevant data are easily available. They
must be consistently and uniformly tractable. They should thus satisfy the
theoretical tenets and not be too difficult to handle empirically. In order to
evaluate the fiscal health or performance, we need to first identify the principles
that would form the conceptual framework. Here we suggest a conceptual
framework (partly inspired by Karnik, Pethe, and Karmarkar, 2002) that is
characterised by EASE. The acronym stands for the following:3
E for equity
A for adequacy
S for simplicity &
E for efficiency.
We will now elaborate on each of the above
Equity is a crucially important need based component. An authority that
assumes a paternal role, vis-à-vis its citizens, can ill afford to neglect this aspect.
Distributional considerations are paramount. Non-homothetic growth may be a
natural phenomenon in some cases, but has weighty objections lined against it in
the context of political economy. If the power has to go to the people and their
aspirations are to find articulation through the functioning of governments, they
have to be empowered. The need for equity is not just based on moral-ethico-
political precepts. Post Keynes and given the inter-dependant nature of a
maturing economy, it is dictated by sturdy economic sense. Unless a basic level
of development and dynamism is achieved in the rural sector, the urban sector
will find it successively more difficult to grow and develop (suffocated as it will be
by effective demand). This of course, will impact on overall economic
development of India as a whole. The huge market potential for both
consumption and producer goods (which is so very essential for a vibrant
economy) will remain a distant chimera. From the specific point of view of this
paper, equity can be broadly looked at in two ways. One, in the tax revenue that
is collected, the component that is raised by way of indirect taxes is considered
iniquitous. Two, we know that consideration of only the tax side without
considering the budget in totality is incorrect. Thus, we consider the impact on
poverty due to fiscal operations as a whole. Using these we try to operationalise
‘equity’.
Adequacy: Scarcity is omnipresent; indeed it is the  raison d’être for
economics and economists. The resource gap between what is available and4
what is ‘needed’ will be with us in the foreseeable future. This reflects what is
‘needed’ by the relevant state government. There is normally a tendency to
overestimate ones own needs (both because one really believes it and also as a
bargaining strategy, especially where  hand-outs are involved). However one
needs to have some sense of the absorptive capacity of the state. Sudden
increase in funds will lead to inefficiencies in terms of consumption as well as
production use.
One way out of the difficulty is to increase the Central pool of funds to be
disbursed to a substantial extent. Given the context of the current fiscal
compression at the Central government level, one cannot realistically expect too
much via this route. The states must learn to stand up for, and help themselves.
This solution has its own limits and is beset with problems; however, there is no
readily available alternative. Efforts for closing this gap by states must be lauded
and rewarded. There are many issues that are involved here. For instance there
is the question of the extent to which sub-national governments may be allowed
to set their own taxes. It is feared that excessive latitude in this regard can create
unacceptable level of complexity and administrative burden, as well as spatial
inequities and distortions in allocation of resources.  Within limits, these problems
need to be tolerated in the interest of gaining the benefits of decentralized
government. There is the other issue of changing regulatory practices in order to
allow a greater access to the credit markets for the State governments. Which of
these is the better option is a moot question answerable only in terms of actual
empirical evidence. Indeed, rather than a clear option, this involves a selection of
a proper mix of these and similar such possibilities. The need to try out
innovative experiments however is beyond doubt. One of the important lessons
that can be learnt from evidence elsewhere is that it is better if commercial
principles are followed and the state governments have to compete for capital
with other borrowing agencies in the interest of efficient utilization of resources.
In this paper, we look at the different resource gaps for the state of Madhya
Pradesh and construct an index thereof.5
Simplicity: This characteristic is very important as it serves – at least
partially –the twin purposes of transparency and accountability. Checking and
replicating the diagnostics/ indices as given by our formulation should be easily
possible in the public domain. Ad-hocism in setting the diagnostics has the great
defect that it makes even discussion and criticism difficult. Also, there is a loss of
credibility and all kinds of suspicions about motivation begins to surface, which is
counter productive. The word “simple” used above is being used as an antonym
of complex. Of course, given the multitude of factors (e.g.,data availability) that
need to be considered, complications are bound to arise. Computational
transparency also lends itself to constructive discussion, in that, it is possible to
undertake the exercise of scenario building and simulation (not done in this
paper), and present it to the ultimate policy maker.
Efficiency: This is really a corner stone of our conceptual framework. In
the present context of the Indian economy, whence we are in the process of
making changes in the way we conduct our macro-management affairs, there
can be no doubt about the importance of having incentive compatible systems in
place. As economists, we would push very hard for this component to be the
most important one in the scheme of things. However, political feasibility as well
as adequacy requirements restrain us from going too far. Incentive compatible
system implies that every effort reflected in performance gets a reward and every
slide on efficiency front is penalised. Also, there is  a static and a dynamic
component to this criterion. For example, if a state is well off in its current
performance terms, this will be a plus. Further, if its performance involves a
switch in regime (i.e., from being relatively better, a state becomes absolutely
better off; illustratively, this will happen when its small deficit changes into
surplus), once again a few bonus points may be given to the State. Alternatively,
a state may be badly off but if it shows improvement (a return of the prodigal to
the fold!) it would be entitled to a bonus. Logically, efficiency as a criterion can
conflict with some of the other components in our conceptual frame. This is a
standard problem of a multi-objective decision function. Thus, it is conceptually
necessary to set up the decision function in an add-on fashion rather than in a6
single simple formula. Of course, ultimately the whole exercise can be
consolidated and hence a single Index is implied, even by this approach (not
attempted in this paper). We have tried to operationalise this criterion by using
several proxies as will be apparent in the next section, where we focus on
Madhya Pradesh.
3.  Madhya Pradesh
The state of Madhya Pradesh (M.P) is the second largest state in India
covering a geographical area of 308 thousand sq. kms. It has an administrative
setup comprising 9 divisions, 45 districts, 370 towns/cities and 55841 villages.
The 2001 census provisionally puts the population of M.P. at 603.85 lakhs and a
population density of 196 persons per sq. km., which is way below the all India
figure of 324. The literacy rate of M.P. as registered in the 2001 census is
64.11%. This is a significant improvement from 52.2% recorded in the 1991
census. The net state domestic product of M.P in real terms (at 93/94 prices)
stood at Rs. 45744.12 crores in 1999/2000 as compared to Rs. 34357.69 crores
in 1994/95. The per capita income in real terms has risen from Rs. 6569 in
1993/94 to Rs. 7846 in 1999/2000. An overview of the progress of Madhya
Pradesh on the fiscal front has been examined in this section of the paper by
examining the broad trends in key fiscal variables in the period 1981/82 to
1999/2000.
3.1 The Fiscal Scenario: An Overview
 The Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) of Madhya Pradesh was at 2.72% of Net
State Domestic Product (SDP) in 1981/82.  The ratio showed a steadily
increasing trend and peaked at 4.14% in 1984/85. Since then a declining trend is
noticed till it reached a low of 2.97% in 1989/90. In 1990/91 this ratio again rose
to 3.33%. The next three years witnessed a declining trend till an all time low of
2.11% was reached in 1993/94. A rising  trend was noticed over the next three
years and it reached 2.93% in 1996/97. After a marginal dip to 2.59% in 1997/987
it shot up to 5.23% in 1998/99. In 1999/2000 GFD stood at 4.42% of SDP.
The Primary Deficit (PD), which is GFD net of interest payments, is an important
indicator to monitor as it nets out interest burden which is a legacy of the past
and thus suggests the extent of fiscal imbalance which is being currently
incurred. Primary deficit for M.P. as a proportion of State Domestic Product stood
at 1.55% in 198/82. It showed an increasing trend and reached a high of 3.98%
in 1984/85. A declining trend is noticed after that till 1993/94 when it reached an
all time low of 0.01%. It rose gradually for the next three years and stood at
0.84% in 1996/97. In 1997/98 it once again declined to 0.23%. In the very next
year 1998/99 it shot up to 2.90%. In 1999/2000 it has once declined by 0.90
percentage points and stood at 2%. Revenue Deficit (RD) is the third and most
crucial deficit indicator to consider as it is a measure of the fiscal profligacy being
indulged in by the state government. The state of Madhya Pradesh experienced
a revenue surplus from 1981/82 to 1986/87. Revenue deficits emerged for the
first time in 1987/88 when it was to the tune of 0.37% of SDP.  The  years
1989/90, 1992/93 and 1993/94 also experienced revenue surpluses. Since then
deficits have been continuously incurred. A maximum of 3.64% was registered in
1998/99. It declined to 3.31% in 1999/2000. Figure 1 below graphs the growth in
deficits. (Details of data are provided in the tables in the appendix). In interpreting
these graphs as well as relative performances some care needs to be taken. For
instance one may have a very low primary or revenue deficit (which normally is a
good thing) but this could be due to the fact that the state’s operations are at
such a low level that it is in fact not performing its essential functions.8
FIGURE 1
Having examined the broad trend in resource gaps as defined in three
different measures of deficits, we now turn to examining the trends observed in
the two policy instruments available to the government viz., expenditures and
receipts. Expenditures are incurred by the government under two broad heads
i.e. revenue expenditures and capital expenditures. Expenditures on revenue
account are incurred on goods and services for current consumption, primarily on
wages and salaries and do not result in creation of assets while expenditures on
capital account, which result in creation of durable assets. Revenue expenditures
are, however, politically sensitive and difficult to prune. This has resulted in the
capital expenditures being slashed under a fiscal crunch situation. This is the
general pattern for all states of India and Madhya Pradesh is no exception. In
1981/82 Revenue expenditures constituted 66.49% of total expenditures and
capital expenditures 33.51%. The ratio has worsened significantly with 89.98% of
total expenditures being incurred on revenue account and a mere 10.14% going
towards capital assets. Figures 2 and 3 below paint a gloomy picture.
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A closer look at some of the components of expenditures does, however, provide
some respite. We took a close look at expenditures on social services as a
proportion of total expenditures and at expenditures on administration as a
proportion of total expenditures. While expenditure on social services may be
considered as desirable, that on administration should be minimised. A large
share of total resources if spent on administration would leave that much less for
provision of public goods. We observe that the state of M.P. spent 26.76% of its
total expenditure on social services in 1981/82. A generally increasing trend is
noticed till 1990/91 when it reached 33.47% in 1990/91. It took a downward path
for the next few years till it reached 28.03% in 1993/94. In 1994/95 it once again
rose to 34.04%. Once again it started declining till 1996/97. It reached an all time
high of 36.28% in 1998/99. In 1999/2000, however, it has been cut by 0.59
percentage points and stands at 35.67%.  Figure 4 below graphs the trend in
expenditure on social services.
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Expenditures on administration siphoned off 6.58% of total
expenditures in 1981/82. This rose to a maximum of 8.04% in 1983/84. In all
other years the share of administrative expenditures has hovered around 7%.
1988/89 and 1996/97 are the two exceptional years when the share of
administration expenditure fell to below the 7% mark. The graph below gives the
broad picture.
FIGURE 5
On the receipts front, the broad classification is into revenue receipts and
capital receipts. Revenue receipts include tax and non-tax revenue. Within both,
tax and non-tax revenues there is the component of own revenues generated by
the state government and that which it receives from the centre in the form of
grants, and its share in central government taxes as stipulated in the
constitutional framework. Within revenue receipts the tax revenue for the state of
M.P. stood at 48.57% in 1981/82. This has oscillated between 44% and 49% till
1986/87. The share of tax revenue crossed the 50% mark and reached 52.16%
in 1989/90. In the very next year it again fell to 48.46% but in 1991/92 it again
rose to 52.81%. For the next three years it remained below the 50% mark. In
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1995/96 it touched a maximum of 54.92%. This fell to just over 50% in
1996/97. In 1997/98 it again climbed to almost 55%. Since then it has shown a
declining trend but remained above the 50% mark. The share of non-tax revenue
in total receipts was 31.31% in 1981/82. It remained around the 30% mark till
1983/84. In the latter half of the 80s the share of non-tax revenues oscillated
around 24% to 27% but it crossed the 30% mark only in 1991/92. Its share
continued to remain above the 30% mark in the first five years of the 90s till
1994/95. In 1995/96 it fell to 28.27% and continuing on a downward path it
reached a low of 21.20% in 1998/99. In 1999/00 it has marginally increased to
22.99%.
The share of own tax revenue of the state in tax revenue is an important
parameter to examine. The state of M.P. seems to have fared extremely well on
this front. Own tax revenue comprised 58.23% of total tax revenue in 1981/82.
This share rose further to 60.59% in 1984/85. It declined marginally and stayed
around 59% for the next three years. In 1988/89 it once again rose to 61.86%.
Since then it has continued to remain above the 60% mark and has risen to an all
time high of 63.99% in 1999/2000.
The share of grants in total receipts varied between 9% to 10% between
1981/82 and 1985/86. It then climbed steadily to 13.63% in 1988/89. It dipped to
9.46% in 1989/90 but varied between 13% to 16% between 1990/91 and
1994/95. Since then a declining trend was noticed and it stood at 9.30% in
1999/00. Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 depict the trends in receipts and its major
components.
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FIGURE 8
FIGURE 9
The highlights of the above discussion on the macro fiscal scenario of Madhya
Pradesh can be summed up as:
q  All three measures of Deficits (Gross Fiscal Deficit, Primary Deficit and
Revenue Deficit) show significant growth and an increasing trend.
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q  Current expenditures i.e. expenditures on revenue account have
increased at the cost of capital expenditures.
q  On the receipts front, Madhya Pradesh has been successful on the front of
own tax effort.
q  The share grants from the centre to the state of Madhya Pradesh show a
declining trend in recent times.
Having noticed a rising share of own tax revenues we constructed a
measure to capture the extent of dependence of the state of Madhya Pradesh.
The Dependency Ratio (DR) as defined in Pattnaik et. al. (1994) is:
E EXPENDITUR TOTAL
TAX NON TAX INCOME OWN E EXPENDITUR TOTAL
RATIO DEPENDENCY
) ( - + -
=
A plot of the Dependency Ratio is seen in figure 10 below.
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The Dependency Ratio (DR) has varied from a low 52% to a high of 58%
between 1981/82 to 1993/94. In 1994/95 it fell sharply to 40% but once again
increased to 51.19% in the vary next year and further to 55% in 1996/97. The last
two years 1998/99 and 1999/00 have witnessed an increasing trend.
We were interested in observing not only the extent of dependence of the
state but also in tracking the  change in dependency ratio. We therefore
computed the annual change in DR and a plot of this is presented in figure 11
below.
FIGURE 11
No clear trend pattern is discernible in the graph above. There is continuous
oscillation in the extent of dependence at around 55%. No significant
improvement or worsening is noticeable with the exception of one peak and one
sharp dip.
With own incomes showing a rising trend but with the dependency ratio
(defined as total expenditure  minus own income as a proportion of total
expenditure) not showing any significant improvement, it is only obvious that
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borrowings of the state government are funding the burgeoning
expenditures on revenue account. This is evident from figure 12 below, which
graphs the mounting interest burden of the state of Madhya Pradesh (see Table
A3 for details).
FIGURE 12
The period between 1981/82 and 1987/88 saw the share of interest payments in
revenue receipts vary between 1.08% in 1984/85 to 10.06% in 1986/87. Since
1988/89 the share of interest payments in revenue receipts have shown a
continuous increase. In 1999/2000 interest payments comprised 16.2% of
revenue receipts.
Having obtained a fair idea of the macro picture that emerges on the fiscal
front for the state of Madhya Pradesh, we proceeded to look at the performance
of the state of M.P. alongside the performance of 13 other major states of India
(including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujrat, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra,
Orissa Punjab, Rajathan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal). Our
sample leaves out the North-eastern states and the special category states from
the analysis. The special category states are characterized by excessive reliance
on central transfers and low capacity for raising own revenues. Comparison of
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the other major states of India, and M.P in particular, with these states would
thus have been fallacious in the present context.
3.2  Computation of Performance Indices with ‘EASE’
In order to judge the performance of M.P vis-à-vis 13 major states of India
we have computed  performance indices conforming  with our conceptual
framework characterised by EASE. Our index was computed as:
At
it
M
M
index
1
1
=
where,
M1it  refers to Measure 1 for state i in time period t
M1At refers to the same Measure 1 obtained for all 14 states  (inclusive of state i)
in time  period t.
This index is obtained for each of the years between 1981/82 and
1999/2000 and for each of the 14 states considered. For purposes of reporting
we have obtained averages of these indices over five years viz. 1981/82 to
1985/86, 1986/87 to 1990/91, 1991/92 to 1996/96 and 1996/97 to 1999/2000. A
break-up of our sample period into four sub-periods helps us track the
improvement or worsening performance of the states. An index equal to 1 implies
that state i follows the average pattern of the major states. The index being
greater or less than unity would suggest if the state is better or worse than the
overall trend depending how the index has been defined.
Finally, on the basis of each of the indices obtained for the five yearly
intervals we have ranked the states. Such a ranking allows us to judge the
performance of M.P and its improvement or deterioration over time not only in
isolation but vis-à-vis other major states. A previous study by Pattnaik  et. al.
(1994) too has ranked the performance of states on the basis of some
constructed measures of resource gap for the periods 1980-87 and 1987-94.19
The methodology elaborated upon in the previous paragraph has
been employed to judge how the state of M.P fares on the front of  Equity,
Adequacy and Efficiency in our EASE framework.
(a) Equity Index 1: Revenue from Direct Taxes as a proportion of total receipts.
 Revenue generated from direct taxes is considered more equitous than that from
indirect taxes, which does not differentiate between people from different income
groups. An index >1 would suggest that the state performs better than the overall
average.
(b)  Equity Index 2 :  Expenditure on Social Services as percent of total
expenditure.
Expenditure on social services like education, health etc. is targeted towards the
poorer section of society and hence more ‘equitous’. An index > 1 would imply
that the state fares better than the average trend.
(c)   Equity Index 3:  Per cent of people below poverty line.
This measure of equity is standard and needs no elaboration. An index > 1 would
imply that the state fares worse than the average trend.
(d)  Adequacy Index: Gross Fiscal Deficit as per cent of SDP.
This measure gives a broad measure of the existing resource gap. An index > 1
would imply that the state fares worse than the average trend. Gross Fiscal
Deficit is defined as given below:
GFD = RE – [CD – (DID+RLA+RLC)] - RR
Where RE = revenue expenditure
CD = capital disbursements
DID = discharge of internal debt
RLA = recovery of loans and advances20
RLC = repayment of loans to the centre.
RR = revenue receipts
(e)  Efficiency Index 1: Dependency Ratio (DR): This measure as defined in
section 3.1 above is:
E EXPENDITUR TOTAL
TAX NON TAX INCOME OWN E EXPENDITUR TOTAL
RATIO DEPENDENCY
) ( - + -
=
The lower the dependency ratio the greater would be the efficiency of the state
government. Thus an index > 1 would imply that the state is worse than the
overall average.
(f)  Efficiency Index 2 : Expenditure on Administration as per cent of  total
expenditure.
Larger expenditure on administration is suggestive of a larger bureaucracy and
thus represents inefficiency. An index > 1 implies that the state is worse than the
overall average.
(g) Efficiency Index 4: Own tax revenue as per cent of total tax revenue
The greater the own tax effort by the state government, the more efficient would
be the state government. In this case an index > 1 implies that the state is better
than the overall average.
To begin with, we computed the three equity indices as defined above.
The results obtained have been tabulated in Tables 1 and 2 below21
TABLE 1
EQUITY INDEX 1 EQUITY INDEX 2 EQUITY INDEX 3
DIRECT TAX REVENUE
(% OF TOTAL RECEIPTS)
EXPENDITURE ON
SOCIAL SERVICES
(% OF TOTAL
EXPENDITURE)
% OF PEOPLE BELOW
POVERTY LINE
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
A.P 0.91 0.77 0.74 0.83 1.19 1.07 1.00 1.02 0.65 0.64 0.77 0.62
BIHAR 0.67 0.50 0.62 0.85 1.04 0.97 1.08 1.08 1.30 1.34 1.29 1.47
GUJRAT 1.00 0.85 0.88 0.86 1.03 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.66
HARYANA 1.05 0.98 0.74 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.83 0.76 0.43 0.40 0.78 0.44
KARNA. 0.95 0.98 1.20 1.23 0.86 1.00 1.02 1.04 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.86
KERALA 1.27 1.19 1.26 0.90 1.33 1.21 1.15 1.05 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.65
M.P 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.82 0.94 1.02 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.09 1.22
MAHA 1.03 1.16 1.48 1.78 0.88 0.93 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.02 1.01 0.99
ORISSA 0.55 0.83 0.41 0.39 1.10 0.97 1.05 1.09 1.40 1.37 1.21 1.52
PUNJAB 1.12 0.86 0.69 0.59 0.80 0.91 0.73 0.72 0.34 0.32 0.59 0.29
RAJAS 0.81 0.66 0.61 0.69 1.07 1.03 1.08 1.14 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.73
TAMIL N. 1.09 1.08 0.99 0.96 1.04 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.10 1.06 0.99 0.94
U.P 1.09 0.96 0.82 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.89 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.11
W.BENG 1.55 2.27 2.43 1.27 1.21 1.15 1.14 1.06 1.14 1.09 1.00 1.05
TABLE 2
RANKS BASED ON
EQUITY INDEX 1
RANKS BASED ON
EQUITY INDEX 2
RANKS BASED ON
EQUITY INDEX 3
14 Major
States DIRECT TAX REVENUE
(% OF TOTAL RECEIPTS)
EXPENDITURE ON
SOCIAL SERVICES
(% OF TOTAL
EXPENDITURE)
% OF PEOPLE BELOW
POVERTY LINE
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
A.P 10 11 8 10 3 4 9 9 3 3 2 3
BIHAR 13 14 12 9 7 10 6 4 13 13 14 13
GUJRAT 8 9 6 8 8 9 11 11 4 5 4 5
HARYANA 6 5 9 7 13 14 13 13 2 2 3 2
KARNA. 9 6 4 3 12 7 8 8 7 7 7 7
KERALA 2 2 3 6 1 1 1 7 5 4 5 4
M.P 12 12 11 11 9 6 4 5 10 11 12 12
MAHA 7 3 2 1 10 11 10 10 8 8 10 9
ORISSA 14 10 14 14 4 8 7 3 14 14 13 14
PUNJAB 3 8 10 13 14 12 14 14 1 1 1 1
RAJAS 11 13 13 12 5 5 5 1 6 6 6 6
TAMIL N. 5 4 5 4 6 3 3 2 11 10 8 8
U.P 4 7 7 5 11 13 12 12 9 9 11 11
W.BENG 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 6 12 12 9 1022
For Equity index 1 (share of direct taxes in total tax revenue) and
Equity index 2 (share of expenditure on social services) an index greater than
unity suggests that the state has done better than the overall average. Based on
Equity index 1 we find that the state of M.P. has marginally improved from 0.75 in
the first sub-period of 81/82 to 85/86 to 0.82 in the period 96/97 to 99/00. Its
relative position among the 14 states has improved from 12
th in the 80s to 11
th in
the 90s. Based on the index of  Equity 2  (share of social services in total
expenditure) a significant improvement is noticed for M.P. Its index has increased
from 0.94 in the first sub-period to 1.08 in the 90s. Its rank has improved from 9
th
in the first half of the 80s to 6
th in the second half of the 80s. In the first five years
of the 90s its rank further improved to 4
th. However, in the latter half of the 90s
the position of the state has slipped to 5
th.
Equity Index 3 considers the per cent of people below poverty line. An
index greater than unity in this case suggests a performance  worse than the
overall average. On this count the state of M.P. has shown steady deterioration.
Its index has worsened from 1.08 in the first sub-period to 1.22 in the last. Its
relative ranking too has shown a steady deterioration. It stood 10
th in the first half
of the 80s. It moved to 11
th in the latter half of the 80s. In the 90s it has held on to
the 12
th position.  Thus, while equity index 1 (share of direct taxes in total
receipts) and equity index 2 (share of expenditure on social services) show that
there has been a move towards more equitous government intervention in the
state of M.P, the third index of equity (% of people below poverty line) suggests
that government intervention does not seem to have succeeded into bringing up
people from below the poverty line. Of course, care has to be taken in
interpreting these indices. The two equity indices and the other indices computed
have to be interpreted in conjunction with each other.
The Adequacy index is defined as Gross Fiscal Deficit as per cent of SDP.
An index greater than unity suggests that the performance has been worse than
the average performance. The indices and ranks obtained are listed in Tables 3
and 4.23
TABLE 3
ADEQUACY INDEX
GROSS FISCAL DEFICIT
( AS % OF STATE
DOMESTIC PRODUCT)
Ranks Based on
ADEQUACY INDEX
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82 to
85/86
86/87 to
90/91
91/92 to
95/96
96/97 to
99/00
A.P 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.82 4 6 8 5
BIHAR 1.06 1.04 1.20 0.79 8 8 10 4
GUJRAT 1.07 1.39 0.89 0.99 9 12 5 8
HARYANA 1.12 0.83 0.80 0.90 10 5 4 6
KARNA. 1.03 0.82 0.97 0.75 7 4 7 3
KERALA 0.81 1.13 1.08 1.06 3 10 9 9
M.P 0.94 0.93 0.74 0.75 5 7 2 2
MAHA 1.02 0.81 0.73 0.91 6 3 1 7
ORISSA 1.20 1.41 1.64 1.75 12 13 14 14
PUNJAB 1.40 1.75 1.51 1.17 14 14 13 10
RAJAS 1.23 1.18 1.32 1.33 13 11 12 13
TAMIL N. 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.72 1 1 3 1
U.P 1.12 1.13 1.30 1.28 11 9 11 12
W.BENG 0.76 0.76 0.91 1.24 2 2 6 11
Over the entire period the adequacy index for M.P. has remained below unity
thus suggesting that it has performed better than the average performance of 14
major states of India. Over the entire sample period being considered, the index
shows an improvement from 0.94 in the first half of the 80s to 0.75 in the last half
of the 90s. However, its relative rank has witnessed ups and downs. Its relative
rank has slipped from 5
th in the first half of the 80s to 7
th in the latter half. In the
90s it showed remarkable improvement and stood 2
nd.
  On the whole, on the front
of Gross Fiscal Deficit, the state of M.P. has performed well and shown an
improvement in the 90s.24
Finally, we examine the performance of M.P. on the basis of the three measures
of efficiency that we have defined in the beginning of this sub-section. Results
obtained have been tabulated in Tables 4 and 5 below.
TABLE 4
EFFICIENCY INDEX 1 EFFICIENCY INDEX 2 EFFICIENCY INDEX 3
DEPENDENCY RATIO (DR) (%)
(Total exp – Own Income
as % of total expend.)
Administrative expend.
(% of total expend.)
Own tax revenue
(% of total tax revenue)
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
A.P. 0.90 0.90 1.03 1.01 1.13 0.90 0.90 0.82 1.03 1.03 0.98 0.99
BIHAR 1.31 1.23 1.33 1.31 1.18 1.26 1.31 1.46 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.54
GUJRAT 0.88 0.86 0.78 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.79 0.72 1.15 1.24 1.20 1.18
HARYANA 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.68 0.85 0.86 0.79 0.77 1.21 1.24 1.23 1.21
KARNA. 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.72 0.77 0.82 0.86 1.09 1.10 1.13 1.10
KERALA 0.92 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.78 0.81 0.73 0.70 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.10
M.P 1.00 1.04 0.97 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.01 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
MAHA 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.76 1.15 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.18 1.20 1.21 1.23
ORISSA 1.29 1.34 1.38 1.36 1.01 0.92 0.83 0.92 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.68
PUNJAB 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.88 0.97 1.19 1.55 1.38 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.21
RAJAS 1.09 1.18 1.15 1.10 0.94 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.95
TAMIL N. 0.89 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.95 0.91 1.00 1.09 1.06 1.10 1.13
U.P 1.22 1.23 1.28 1.25 0.98 1.09 1.09 1.17 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.77
W.BENG 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.26 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.07 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.9025
TABLE 5
RANKS BASED ON
EFFICIENCY INDEX 1
RANKS BASED ON
EFFICIENCY INDEX 2
RANKS BASED ON
EFFICIENCY INDEX 3
DEPENDENCY RATIO (DR)
(Total exp - Own Income as per
cent of total expend.)
Administrative expend.  (%
of total expend.
Own tax revenue as % of total
tax revenue
14 Major
States
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
81/82
to
85/86
86/87
to
90/91
91/92
to
95/96
96/97
to
99/00
A.P 6 5 9 8 12 6 7 5 8 8 8 8
BIHAR 14 12 13 13 14 14 13 14 14 14 14 14
GUJRAT 3 4 3 5 5 5 3 2 4 2 4 4
HARYANA 2 2 1 1 3 4 2 3 2 1 1 2
KARNA. 4 3 4 3 1 1 4 6 5 5 5 6
KERALA 7 8 7 7 2 3 1 1 7 7 7 7
M.P 9 9 8 9 10 9 9 9 11 11 11 11
MAHA 1 1 2 2 13 11 11 11 3 4 3 1
ORISSA 13 14 14 14 9 7 5 7 13 13 13 13
PUNJAB 8 7 5 6 7 13 14 13 1 3 2 3
RAJAS 11 11 11 10 6 2 6 4 10 10 10 9
TAMIL N. 5 6 6 4 4 8 8 8 6 6 6 5
U.P 12 13 12 11 8 10 10 12 12 12 12 12
W.BENG 10 10 10 12 11 12 12 10 9 9 9 10
For Efficiency index 1 and 2, an index greater than unity indicates a
performance worse than the average. However, for Efficiency index 3, an index
greater than unity is indicative of performance better than the average.
Based on  Efficiency index 1  i.e. as far as the Dependency Ratio is
concerned, the performance index for the state of M.P was unity in the first half of
the 80s. In the latter half it deteriorated to 1.04. In the first half of the 90s it
improved and in fact surpassed the average performance of other major states
with its index falling below unity (0.97). In the latter half of the 90s the
performance on this front has once again deteriorated to 1.03. M.P’s relative rank
stood at 9 throughout the 80s, it improved to 8 in the first half of the 90s but has
once again slipped to 9
th in the latter half of the 90s.
Efficiency index 2 is defined as the share of expenditure on administration
in total expenditure. Its index stood at 1.02 through the 80s. In the first half of the
90s it improve to reach 1. In the latter half of the 90s the index has improved
marginally to reach 1.01. The position of M.P. was 10
th in the beginning of the
80s. Since the mid 80s, however, it has occupied the 9
th position.26
Efficiency index 3 defined as the share of own tax revenue in total tax
revenue. For this index an index greater than unity signifies a performance better
than the average. The state of M.P. has done poorly on this count consistently.
Its index has been consistent and stood at 0.88 throughout the 80s and the 90s.
Its has consistently held on to the 11
th position in the rank tally.
Finally, an ad-hoc grand rank has been obtained for Equity, Adequacy and
Efficiency for each of the states. Since three different indices have been used for
Equity we summed up the ranks obtained for each of the indices and for the four
time intervals so as to arrive at one number for Equity. A similar exercise was
carried out for Efficiency. In case of the Adequacy index only one measure has
been used so only a summation of the four time intervals was required. The
states were then re-arranged and the state with the lowest summation of the
ranks was allotted the first grand rank. Results obtained have been tabulated
below
TABLE 6
Grand Rank for Adequacy Grand Rank for Efficiency Grand Rank for Equity
1 TAMIL NADU 1 HARYANA 1 KERALA
2 MADHYA PRADESH 2 GUJRAT 2 WEST BENGAL
3 MAHARASHTRA 3 KARNATAKA 3 HARYANA
4 KARNATAKA 4 MAHARASHTRA 4 GUJRAT
5 WEST BENGAL 5 KERALA 5 MAHARASHTRA
6 ANDHRA PRADESH 6 TAMIL NADU 6 TAMIL NADU
7 HARYANA 7 PUNJAB 7 PUNJAB
8 BIHAR 8 ANDHRA PRADESH 8 RAJASTHAN
9 KERALA 9 RAJASTHAN 9 KARNATAKA
10 GUJRAT 10 MADHYA PRADESH 10 UTTAR PRADESH
11 UTTAR PRADESH 11 WEST BENGAL 11 ORISSA
12 RAJASTHAN 12 ORISSA 12 MADHYA PRADESH
13 PUNJAB 13 UTTAR PRADESH 13 BIHAR
14 ORISSA 14 BIHAR 14 ANDHRA PRADESH
For the purpose of summarising our results one could say that the state of
M.P. has fared well on the adequacy front with a rank of 2, fared not so well on
the efficiency front with a rank of 10 and fared even worse on the equity front with
a rank of 12. However, there are two points that we would like to draw attention27
to with regard to the interpretation of these ranks and indices computed.
Firstly, these ranks indicate the  relative performance of the states. The
performance of Madhya Pradesh is being judged relative to the overall average
performance of 14 major states of India. So, while the state of M.P. may have
done well to improve its own performance this may not be reflected in the indices
computed or the ranks allotted. A straightforward illustration of this point is seen
from the performance of the state of Madhya Pradesh as regards its own tax
effort. Table A3 and Figure 8 clearly indicate that the state has done well to
increase its share of own tax revenue in total tax revenue from 58.23% in
1981/82 to 63.99% in 1999/2000. However, Tables 4 and 5 above show that its
index has remained consistent at 0.88 and it is ranked 11 over the entire sample
period. This suggests that the state of M.P. has not fared particularly well relative
to the average overall performance of 14 major states of India.
The second point that we wish to re-iterate is that  numbers do not
necessarily reveal the full story. It may be that a state is seen to do well in
spending a lower share on revenue expenditures. Technically, this state would
have received a good rank in our exercise.  However, this could well be due to
the fact that the state is operating at a low level of activity and in fact, may not be
performing its essential functions. Thus, we can hardly over emphasize the need
for caution when interpreting the results of any empirical exercise (including
ours).
  4. Conclusion
For the limited purpose of this paper, we are done. In this paper we have
suggested a framework and computational methodology for evaluating the fiscal
health of a State economy. We have also illustrated the use of our framework for
the case of Madhya Pradesh. It cannot be over emphasized that this is an
exploratory work and represents an unfinished research agenda. The graphs
reported and indices computed do lead to some important insights, as we have
mentioned at various points in the text. There are two aspects of this that are of28
vital importance, one, the theoretical underpinnings of these indices have to
be studied; two, these indices have to be put together to form a grand index.
These, we dare say are non-trivial tasks but must wait another day.
More importantly this paper looks only (albeit advisedly) at the broad
macro picture. However important that cannot ever be enough. Indeed we are
aware that god and devil lie in the detail! The structural details of various macro
variables studied here have to be put under a microscope. Even then the answer
to the question: where do we go from here, is likely to be far from obvious. The
micro-dynamic path of implementation of finely tuned policy design has to be
traced, constrained as it inevitably is, by the domain of political feasibility. That,
we are sure is an agenda not for the weak hearted!
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APPENDIX
KEY MACRO INDICATORS FOR THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
TABLE A1
YEAR
 GROSS FISCAL
DEFICIT
(% of SDP)
REVENUE
DEFICIT
(% of SDP)
PRIMARY
DEFICIT
(% of SDP)
81/82 2.72 -2.61 1.55
82/83 2.91 -1.88 1.78
83/84 3.14 -1.50 2.40
84/85 4.14 -0.66 3.98
85/86 3.70 -0.51 2.75
86/87 3.90 -0.24 2.10
87/88 3.90 0.32 2.33
88/89 3.98 0.67 2.17
89/90 2.97 -0.40 1.19
90/91 3.33 0.66 1.66
91/92 3.06 0.14 1.17
92/93 2.45 -0.85 0.31
93/94 2.11 -1.04 0.01
94/95 2.76 0.37 0.63
95/96 2.85 0.83 0.83
96/97 2.93 2.20 0.84
97/98 2.59 0.67 0.23
98/99 5.23 3.64 2.90
99/00 4.42 3.31 2.0030
TABLE A2
Revenue
Expend.
( % of Total
Expend.)
Capital
Disbursements
 (% of Total
Expend.)
Total Exp.On
Social Services
(% Of Total
Expend.)
Adminstrative
Expend.
(% of Total
Expend.)
81/82 66.49 33.51 26.76 6.58
82/83 68.53 31.47 27.31 6.23
83/84 69.87 30.13 28.50 8.04
84/85 68.75 31.25 29.99 7.00
85/86 72.11 27.89 31.73 7.62
86/87 75.59 24.41 30.97 7.33
87/88 77.65 22.35 32.60 7.59
88/89 78.72 21.28 33.06 6.94
89/90 78.36 21.64 33.56 7.77
90/91 80.46 19.54 33.47 7.11
91/92 81.67 18.33 33.02 7.21
92/93 80.35 19.65 31.82 7.10
93/94 84.68 15.32 28.03 7.10
94/95 83.83 16.17 34.04 7.09
95/96 86.29 13.71 33.51 7.43
96/97 87.54 12.46 32.48 6.76
97/98 82.44 17.56 32.71 7.09
98/99 89.04 10.96 36.28 7.64
99/00 89.86 10.14 35.67 7.3931
TABLE A3
Tax
Revenue
(% of Total
Receipts)
Non-Tax
Revenue
(% of Total
receipts)
Grants
(% of Total
Receipts)
Own Tax
Revenue
(% of Total
Tax Revenue)
Interest
Payments
(% of
Revenue
Receipts)
81/82 48.57 31.31 10.51 58.23 7.59
82/83 48.58 30.58 9.96 60.00 7.44
83/84 44.53 30.66 10.86 60.31 4.79
84/85 48.17 26.03 9.74 60.59 1.08
85/86 45.22 24.88 9.49 59.29 6.13
86/87 49.07 27.68 11.98 59.33 10.06
87/88 45.48 27.76 11.66 59.97 9.74
88/89 49.26 29.83 13.63 61.86 11.42
89/90 52.16 25.56 9.46 60.65 11.17
90/91 48.46 28.99 14.63 61.82 11.28
91/92 52.81 30.50 14.39 62.12 11.30
92/93 49.77 33.01 15.87 60.25 11.51
93/94 49.51 30.80 14.55 61.43 12.28
94/95 49.80 30.14 13.19 60.49 14.36
95/96 54.92 28.27 11.18 61.59 13.38
96/97 50.04 24.32 9.65 60.89 13.74
97/98 54.88 23.41 12.48 60.35 14.75
98/99 51.57 21.20 11.89 63.53 16.17
99/00 50.22 22.99 9.30 63.99 16.2032
TABLE A4
Dependency
Ratio (%)
Annual Change
in Dependency
ratio
81/82 55.88
82/83 53.14 -2.73
83/84 55.34 2.19
84/85 52.92 -2.41
85/86 57.85 4.93
86/87 56.67 -1.18
87/88 58.29 1.61
88/89 56.57 -1.72
89/90 52.55 -4.02
90/91 56.64 4.09
91/92 55.40 -1.23
92/93 55.97 0.57
93/94 53.62 -2.35
94/95 40.07 -13.55
95/96 51.49 11.42
96/97 55.08 3.59
97/98 54.03 -1.05
98/99 55.37 1.34
99/00 57.80 2.4433
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